THE FIGHTING SEASON: THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARISATION OF PUBLIC SPACES FROM KABUL TO MELBOURNE

THE FIGHTING SEASON: THOUGHTS ON THE MILITARISATION OF PUBLIC SPACES FROM KABUL TO MELBOURNE

The twilight zone between the end of the festive season and the resumption of the work year is, of late, a good opportunity to make the most of our Netflix and Stan subscriptions and in amongst the growing clutter of Bollywood movies and incomprehensible Taiwanese rom-coms we were able to find a few gems with which to pass the time.

A recent addition to the lineup was Ricky Schroder’s six part documentary series The Fighting Season, which follows several units of U.S Army military advisors and their Afghan allies as they develop security arrangements in Kabul during an election campaign, hunt Taliban fighters in the countryside and attempt to kill or capture an elusive insurgent commander.

To be frank, Schroder is a propagandist of the Obama era military effort in Afghanistan and the phased draw-down of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); in general his film leans toward supporting the narrative of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police finding their feet and slowly taking responsibility for their own security.

The Fighting Season, however, is very revealing in its depiction of modern, highly specialised combat troops re-tasked as, basically, police units and tactical response teams on overwatch, ready to leap into action should the Afghan forces get in over their heads.

Ricky schroder
Ricky Schroder, the former 1970’s child star is now an effective propagandist for the U.S war machine

In that sense this is a curious story, it has little in common with other War On Terror films, such as Sebastian Junger’s excellent Restrepo, or the dismal spectacle of the Ben Anderson documentary This Is What Winning Looks Like; the U.S paratroopers and 10th Mountain Division soldiers as depicted by Schroder exude a barely repressed bitterness and frustration even as they repeat the talking points of the official narrative.

From the slightly loopy security commander swanning around the teeming streets of Kabul as if he is going out for ice cream in his Midwestern hometown, seemingly oblivious to the threat of suicide bombers and kidnappers; to the hardened African American forward air controller calling in bombing runs on Taliban snipers these characters all ooze a superficial confidence and self control, but it is clear that they hate what they are doing and are deeply skeptical of the mission.

To be frank, Schroder is a propagandist of the Obama era military effort in Afghanistan and the phased draw-down of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); in general his film leans toward supporting the narrative of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police finding their feet and slowly taking responsibility for their own security.

Part of the dramatic tension which sets the pace across The Fighting Season’s six episodes is the sense that the Americans cannot trust the Afghan civilians, or rely upon the ANA and National Police to do their jobs; these are not, however, the drug addicts, child molesters and congenital idiots shown by Vice and Ben Anderson in 2013; on the contrary the Afghan soldiers are a mixed bag, ranging from merely competent, to tactically astute and, in some cases, almost suicidally brave.

sebastian junger tim hetherington
Sebastian Junger and Tim Hetherington produced an excellent film ,Restrepo, which captured life on a remote American firebase in the wilds of Afghanistan

Whether this is a completely accurate portrayal of the real ANA is another matter, we suspect the reality lies somewhere between Anderson’s pessimism and Schroders optimism; what is interesting from the point of our social commentary is this idea of a semi-competent but poorly equipped security force moving among the general population and maintaining a physical presence on the ground; guarded all the while by a high-tech, highly effective surveillance and intelligence group and backed up by heavily armed tactical units whose only task is to respond to emergencies.

It is this three-tiered security system used by foreign occupation forces in counter-insurgency operations, on behalf of their client regimes, which caught the eye of our writers; despite differences in the tempo of operations and the nature of the threats to civilians there is much in The Fighting Season which will feel familiar to the viewers, tucked up safe in their homes in the suburbs.

To the keen observer, there are distinct parallels between the militarization of public space in Afghanistan and the hardening of security precautions, recent restructure of police forces and the massive ramping up of state surveillance in Australian societies.

col graham
Colonel John Graham , on the right, confers with his long-suffering bodyguard; the colonel is a weird sort of fellow but his story is very interesting

One of the most striking scenes in Schroder’s series shows American advisors driving around Kabul performing spot checks on Afghan police vehicle control points; the commander of the inspection team, Colonel Graham who is, as we mentioned, somewhat of a weird, reckless character spends some minutes in effusive praise of the officers who man these roadblocks, search cars and try to detect Jihadist suicide bombers as they enter the city.

To the keen observer there are distinct parallels between the militarisation of public space in Afghanistan and the hardening of security precautions, recent restructure of police forces and the massive ramping up of state surveillance in Australian societies.

What Graham is saying, if we read between the lines, is that the ANP officers, the lowest tier of the security operation, are basically expendable; it is expected that if a suicide bomber or insurgent gunman is detected that there will be police casualties and that they are only expected to hold their own until the American rapid response teams and Afghan special forces can be scrambled, with their armoured vehicles, superior training and heavy weapons.

Put that into the context of Melbourne or Sydney, sure the threat is lower here and we do not have terrorist attacks every few weeks as they do in Kabul but broadly the same tactical, counterinsurgency regime is being applied in our cities; first responders, usually general duties police, will generally be running blindly into danger during an attack and even in bucolic Melbourne it is understood that they make take casualties before the better-equipped squads are deployed.

Afghan joint
An Afghan policeman smokes a spliff while on patrol in a scene from the confronting 2013 Vice documentary This Is What Winning Looks Like

Colonel Graham proudly shows off his “Ring Of Steel” around Kabul, the picket of concrete bollards, chicanes and fighting positions which has been built across Kabul to, if nothing else, impede insurgent attacks until a counter attack can be mounted; the topic of insurgent attacks is discussed as a certainty and the one gets the sense that the lowest tier officers and fortifications are in place to absorb most of the impact, that crime cannot be prevented, only a reactive use of force is available to mop up after any initial strike on the barricades.

In our cities similar measures are now in place: in keeping with the threat levels we have concrete bollards and discrete hardening of urban infrastructure, soft checkpoints such as booze buses and Protective Service officers at railway stations and the network of private security guards, authorised officers and municipal inspectors who provide eyes on capability across the community.

The Fighting Season’s other plot-lines provide not only the most exciting battlefield action sequences but show the middle path of pro-active counter-insurgent operations; the tactics of the famed U.S 10th Mountain Division and their ANA allies sit between the nearly passive defences of the “Ring Of Steel” and the reactive elements of the ISAF Quick Reaction Force made up of paratroopers and commandos.

The young American soldiers clearly hate the Afghan locals and gleefully take on the task of “getting in the face” of suspected Taliban insurgents; it is here we can see a contrast between this middle tier of counter terrorism operations in a combat zone and the pro-active policing efforts in the suburbs of Australian cities.

The young American soldiers clearly hate the Afghan locals and gleefully take on the task of “getting in the face” of suspected Taliban insurgents; it is here we can draw a comparison between this middle tier of counter-terrorism operations in a combat zone and the pro-active policing efforts in the suburbs of Australian cities.

forward
Forward Air Controller Sergeant Letnam, his hatred of the Afghans is apparent after he calls in an airstrike on a Taliban sniper nest and the insurgents walk away from the bombed-out position grinning and denying that they are fighters.

The point of the 10th Mountain troops operation was to disrupt, disturb and confront the Taliban and other outlaws, to break their routines, rattle their nerves and if possible kill or capture the fighters and drug smugglers; they patrolled in known Taliban strongholds, rousted their supporters in the villages, confiscated any goods or weapons suspected of belonging to fighters and attempted, by show of force, to diminish the Islamists standing in the community.

Australian police will claim that they are also pro-active when it comes to fighting our own low-level Islamic insurgency and gang crime, however it is this middle tier which, to many, has been the weak link in the local response, this is the cohort which has, in the minds of many workers been hobbled by political correctness and the point of the spear, so to speak, blunted by interference from government and social justice warriors.

It is generally accepted now that the day-to-day attempts by Australian police to play the “hearts and minds” routine in high crime suburbs, particularly those with high Third World migrant populations, have been a failure; what is more, by showing weakness they have actually made the problems worse.

What the people are becoming really agitated about is the weak effort at disrupting criminals and terrorists before they become a real problem, that not enough is being done to shut down radical Islamist recruiters and other fringe dwellers; there is also general outrage over the lack of in-patient services for the dangerously mentally ill or drug addicted and the apparent hands-off approach being taken toward ethnocentric criminal gangs.

It is significant that Aussie workers have quickly cottoned on to the fact that the fortification of public spaces and expansion of heavily armed flying squads are a necessary and proportionate reaction to the current threat environment; nobody seems particularly bothered by the sight of semi-trailers being used as shields against vehicle attacks outside the Cricket, or the unmarked vans cruising the streets loaded with specialist police armed with assault rifles.

What the people are becoming really agitated about is the weak effort at disrupting criminals and terrorists before they become a real problem, that not enough is being done to shut down radical Islamist recruiters and other fringe dwellers; there is also general outrage over the lack of in-patient services for the dangerously mentally ill or drug addicted and the apparent hands-off approach being taken toward ethnocentric criminal gangs.

sog
Tactical squads only arrive as an emergency unfolds, they are a reactive force, not pro-active.

In the general discussion of the militarization of police in Australia and the wider Anglosphere the tendency is, especially among the more libertarian or SJW cliques, to criticise the obvious trappings of the heightened security posture; the self-styled “cop watchers” seem to think that a citywide crackdown on civil liberties is underway merely because the security services have been on a spending spree, purchasing new carbines, armoured vehicles and surveillance gear.

As we have shown it is the tactical posture and the way policing is being conducted in our cities which is evidence of the move toward a counterinsurgency model rather than the traditional, low-key methods of the past; the real problem then becomes the synchronisation of the three tiers of security response: the bullet sponge beat cops, security guards and the fortifications; the pro-active, day-to-day, operations to disrupt, eliminate or humiliate Jihadis and criminal gangs and the rapid reaction forces who only appear once the threat is fully realised

Older Aussies may pine for the society we had and the bright future it promised, but which was squandered by the globalists; unfortunately there is the way things ought to be and the way things are; if Melbourne and Sydney are starting to resemble Kabul then half measures, a compassionate approach and political correctness have no place in the system.

If we are to accept this new security regime, which it is clear we must, at least in the short term purely as a matter of self-preservation then we expect the middle tier of state counter-terrorism operators and ASIO goons to emulate the 10th Mountain division in proportion to the scale of the threat.

If the cops are not kicking in the doors of rogue Imams, leaning hard on self-styled immigrant “community leaders” and making the lives of slacker Jihadis and ethnocentric street gangs utterly miserable then front line cops will have their blood spilled over those concrete bollards before the rapid reaction force can arrive, their bravery and that of the citizens who rush forward into danger will all count for nothing.

We, the workers of Australia, know what has to be done and we know why these very real but wholly imported threats to our lives have been allowed to fester all these years; we know that terrorism and ethnic gang crime is a direct result of globalist-capitalism, the vanity and cynicism of upper-class Whites and the creed of totalitarian humanism.

Older Aussies may pine for the society we had and the bright future it promised, but which was squandered by the globalists; unfortunately there is the way things ought to be and the way things are; if Melbourne and Sydney are starting to resemble Kabul then half measures, a compassionate approach and political correctness have no place in the system.

If we are to suffer under an insurgency where terrorism and gross crimes of violence are simply to be accepted as part of the “enriching” multicultural tapestry, then the security forces need to get serious; they should at least get the three tiers of policing working effectively, in the manner of ISAF and the SJW’s, politicians and do-gooders need to be kicked to the curb and no longer heard.

ring of steel
Afghan National Police: Expendable personnel deployed in the “Ring Of Steel” to absorb attacks, rather than repel them
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ASSERTIVE NEUTRALITY: THE NATIONALIST ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

ASSERTIVE NEUTRALITY: THE NATIONALIST ANTI-WAR MOVEMENT

In our ideological struggle against the system and its toadies, we must constantly be on the front foot in terms of laying out for our people exactly where we stand on the issues of the day.

It should go without saying that Australian Nationalists oppose, on principle, any involvement of the national defence forces in the wars of imperialism currently being waged by the so-called “coalition of the willing”.

Our doctrine of identity, independence and freedom sits at the polar extreme to that of all-conquering globalist capitalism; we value genuine diversity among the nations of the world, a position which obviously rejects any false notions of equality, supremacy or inferiority in the relationships between the mosaic of national groups.

Furthermore, we reject out of hand the adherence to treaties entailing international obligations which might needlessly put our people in harm’s way at the behest of the superpowers, or which could seriously interfere with the self-determination, good order or sovereignty of other nations.

aleppo
Aleppo, Syria: a tragic situation, but it has nothing to do with us

 

For example, our position on the recent Sunni insurgencies in Syria and Iraq has been consistent as we have stated from the beginning of the hostilities that this conflict should be fought and won by a strong coalition of Middle-Eastern regional forces and their northern hemisphere allies.

This eternal struggle for the soul of the Islamic world has nothing whatsoever to do with Australians, who are a people of the global south and should see ourselves as a nation apart from the endless squabbling among some 70 factions of Mohammedans with their myriad tribal and ethnic divisions.

There is no need for a nation of the south, which is socially, racially and geographically a world away from North Asia to be involved in the politics of that region, especially not as the yapping Lap Dog of the clown president Donald Trump and his Zionist cronies.

So too the sabre rattling by Canberra’s imperial globalist warmongers against the hermit state of North Korea is strongly condemned by Australian Nationalists for it is no concern of ours whether the Kim family stands or falls as rulers, or whether their crypto-Fascist system of government remains in place.

KCNA picture of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un speaking at the first party committee meeting in Pyongyang
We would bet the farm that Kim Jong Un will never bother us if we do not bother him

 

The possession of weapons of mass destruction by such regimes has, in recent times, tended to mitigate against widespread conventional warfare of the sort which ravaged the world in the 20th century, so it is no concern of ours whether North Korea remains as it is, armed to the teeth and ruled by a despot and his secret police.

There is no need for a nation of the south, which is socially, racially and geographically a world away from North Asia to be involved in the politics of that region, especially not as the yapping lap Dog of the clown president Donald Trump and his Zionist cronies.

The threats posed by Jihadism are likewise made far more manageable by a prudent immigration program which excludes non-assimilable Mohammedans, a move to Australian neutrality in foreign affairs, including cutting ties with the Zionist entity and an end to opportunistic political support for Islamism by the current political elites.

 

Talal Almeddine
Talal Almeddin and the other plotters of the Parramatta outrage are symptoms, not the disease and the cure is simple

 

As a nation we are blessed to inhabit one of the quieter corners of the globe and Nationalists feel no shame in our past reputation as a cozy, bucolic backwater at the ends of the earth, this ideal is, in fact, the state of affairs which patriotic folk ought to have explicitly tried to “reclaim” in the heady days of 2015.

The threats posed by Jihadism are likewise made far more manageable by a prudent immigration program which excludes non-assimilable Mohammedans, a move to Australian neutrality in foreign affairs, including cutting ties with the Zionist entity and an end to opportunistic political support for Islamism by the current political elites.

In the era of immigration restriction and White supremacy Australia was a genuinely progressive society and despite being embroiled in the wars of the 20th century, the second of which was unavoidable anyway, there was a sense of relentless forward momentum, optimism and the feeling that through the pursuit of social justice at home we might lead by example the developing nations of the world.

The heroes of Kokoda and the men who fought the campaigns against Japanese Fascism across our region are the examples for our assertive brand of neutrality; they fought for blood and soil, in the interests of their nation against a foe who sought to obliterate all societies in its path and impose totalitarian rule across the Pacific.

Let us be clear, however, that we are in no way “Antifascist” in the context of the fake Left and Zionist Right, we are simply aloof from that fraudulent and time-wasting argument because Australian Nationalists are the legitimate heirs and standard bearers of the political theories and way of life which exterminated the anti-national, totalitarian regimes of the 20th century.

kokoda_australians
The heroes of Kokoda, they fought against imperialist bullies and the killers of nations

 

To hostile powers, despots and imperialists Australian Nationalists would issue the admonition: leave us alone and benefit from our diplomatic skills, engineering prowess and scientific know-how; trade with us and receive goods of the best quality, clean foodstuffs and licences to deal your produce in kind.

However, intimidate or threaten us, make demands of, or coerce our nearest neighbours and, as an armed but neutral nation, we will send you scurrying away, starving and in rags, like General Horii and his Japanese forces in 1942.

Australian Nationalists hate war and imperialism, we hate the anti-nationalist, globalist thugs who are flourishing under Trump and Turnbull just as our forebears hated the anti-nationalist bullies of the 1930’s and 1940’s.

eureka